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This study examines the role -which the American Merchant Marine
plays in our national economy and its contribution to the economic
welfare of the country. This study -will further examine the merchant
marine as a potential defense force, its present defense capabilities,
and the government programs and legislation designed to support it.
The present government assistance program is determined inadequate to
meet the nation's need for a merchant marine of modern, efficient and
competitive vessels; and a program aimed at making the shipping
industry self-supporting through research and development, increased






1. History and Development 1
2. The Merchant Marine and National Economy 13
3. Political and Economic Aspects 20
h» Legislation and Subsidies 33







1. Water-Borne Imports and Exports Per Cent
by United States Flag 10
2. Selected Merchant Fleets of the World 23
3. Employment of United States-Flag Merchant Ships 2k
h* Average Daily Operating Costs C-2 Vessel
Various Flags—Estimates 196U 29
5. Operating-Differential Subsidies January 1, 19h7 to





1. Total U.S. Foreign Trade and the Volume Carried on




One of the most important factors to be considered in measuring
the economic capability of any nation is its ability to carry on for-
eign commerce and international trade. Throughout history, the most
powerful and influential governments have been those -which develop
their trade potentials and foster policies designed to improve their
national positions on the markets of the world. The United States, as
the leader in world trade, has a direct interest, therefore, in ocean
shipping which carries out our trading functions by moving goods and
materials in international as well as domestic waters.
The natural harbors along the North American coastlines, an exten-
sive internal transportation system, and the superior technological
skills of the American people would seem to indicate a favorable
atmosphere for the presence of a large and highly competitive national
merchant fleet to support such a trade. Such is not the case. To
preserve the American flag on the high seas since the turn of the cen-
tury has required considerable assistance on the part of the federal
government. This has been due to the higher costs of operating and
building American ships as compared 1<o the costs of operating similar
vessels under foreign flags or building them in foreign shipyards.
Government support of the American Merchant Marine and the related
ship building industry has been deemed essential for two reasons.
First, in the normal conduct of world trade and foreign commerce, an
American-flag fleet ensures the independence of our international
commerce from unwarranted influence of foreign interests, and guaran-
tees us access to all of the world market. It provides the United

States national self-sufficiency in ocean transportation, a most impor-
tant factor in our present political-economic conflict. Second, is our
national requirements for a fleet of modern ships ready and suitable to
meet the demands of a national emergency. During periods of relative
tranquility or small localized conflicts, such as that pjtesently in
Viet Nam, operating ships of all countries are readily available to
carry the bulk of raw materials and finished products in support of
international commerce. However, at the first signs of increased world
tension or the actual outbreak of hostilities, augmented demands are
placed in the existing fleets and premium rates must be paid for the
available cargo space which becomes practically non-existant to any
nation that does not have a merchant fleet of its own of sufficient
quantity and quality to which it can turn. The quantity and quality of
ships and personnel immediately available in the event of any emergency
are the same as those employed in the pursuit of the world's normal
peacetime commerce.
The United States as a world power and leader among nations,
cannot afford to be without a merchant fleet capable of providing
peacetime shipping services on essential trade routes, and, available
to serve in time of national emergency. According to President
Johnson:
A strong merchant marine is a guarantee of economic
stability and a guarantee of national security.
^
In view of the depreciated state of the maritime industry and the scope
and nature of the programs designed to support it, there appears to be
1
Lyndon B. Johnson, President of the United States, in a speech
during the Keel Laying Ceremony of the SS Louise Lykes, January, 196U.
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little likelihood that our required national goals for the United
States Merchant Marine will be realized under present government
regulations and policies. The primary consideration of this paper is






Full appreciation of an American Merchant Marine requires some
knowledge of its historical development and its contributions to the
nation through the years, in times of both peace and war. As a general
rule, wars have been responsible for the peaks in the shipping industry
of America; and peace or the slack periods between wars have usually
been associated with the low points.
Since the founding of our nation, the importance of a strong
American Merchant Marine has been many times forcibly demonstrated.
Those who first explored and colonized the country came here in ships;
and ships were their first means of communication and trade with each
other, and with other countries. In war, merchant ships served first
as the only American Navy, later as an important supplement to the
regular Navy.
To the early colonists, lumber for shipbuilding was plentiful and
trade a necessity for survival. Costs of American-built vessels were
low; and by the time of the American Revolution, a full one-third of
England's "merchantmen" had had their keels laid in the colonies.
As early as 1789, the need of government assistance to the American
Merchant Marine was recognized in the form of a 10 per cent discount on
tariff duties for goods imported on American-flag vessels . An early-
established government policy of full encouragement of shipping as a
national industry formed the basis for the American carriage of approx-
imately 90 per cent of our foreign trade by 1790. This same high
percentage of carriage in American "bottom*" continued until 18U0. This
1

was the period of the clipper ship and is justifiably called the "most
glorious period in the history of the American Merchant Marine." C283
By i860, the two main merchant fleets in the world were those of
Great Britain with £.7 million tons and the United States with £.3
million tons. Until this point in our history, American-flag ships
had been favored by the navigation laws of the major maritime nations
and coupled with the superior carrying capacity, speed and seaworthi-
ness of American ships, our merchant fleet was placed in a superior
competitive position in the ocean-carrying trade. The replacement of
the sailing vessel by the steamship and substitution of iron for wood
in the shipbuilding turned the tide; and, although our government had
granted subsidies to steamships in excess of $lU million, non-subsid-
ized sailing packets and clippers in the Atlantic and California trades
were the only American-flag ships making money at this time.C28]]
The Civil War took a heavy toll in the form of destruction of many
wooden American ships, and set the stage for the further decline of our
merchant marine. Internal development became the focal point of both
private and public endeavor, and our fleet disappeared almost entirely
from the high seas. By the late 1890' s we had only one trans-Atlantic
shipping line in operation j and, even though the Spanish-American War
was a comparatively small operation, it was necessary to acquire mer-
chant shipping from other countries to supply our demands in Cuba.
From a defense point of view, Dyer notes of the Great White Fleet
of 1907 and 1908;
So scanty were our own Navy's logistical resources that
73 per cwit of the coal needed for the cruise was supplied by
foreign sources. Even in San Francisco Bay, the Fleet
received its coal from British and Norwegian ships and
contractors . C6l]

A revival of the 1789 discriminatory tariff (this time for a £ per
cent discount) was attempted in 1913 > but the particular provision
became controversial as several of our treaties contained non-discrim-
ination clauses; and the Supreme Court declared it invalid.
World War I found the United States carrying only 9 per cent of
its own foreign trade, and foreign ships upon which we had depended
were called into the mobilization effort of their own countries and
were no longer available to us. American ports became bottle-necks
of export cargo. Backlogs ran into the freight yards causing immobil-
ization of railroad facilities; and with bankruptcy threatening the
commercial export trade, emergency measures were necessary. Relief
came in the form of the Shipping Act of 1916.
This Act set the stage for a 2,318 vessel shipbuilding program
from 1918 to 1922, and establishment of a Shipping Board to regulate
freight rates and building costs which had skyrocketed due to the short
supply of tonnage. Creation of the Emergency Fleet Corporation under
the Board to build and operate the ships, was a move to accelerate the
program. Annual construction in deadweight tonnage more than tripled
from 191U-1916 averages to 1917' s figure of 9^0,000 tons. In 1918
construction rose to 2,600,000 deadweight tons. Few of these vessels
built at a cost of about $3 billion were used in the war, however.
The greatest need had come in mid-1918, when it was necessary to move
troops and supplies to France; but, the much needed tonnage was still
under construction and of little help on the shipyard j&ways • Had our
allies not come to our aid with over a million tons of shipping during
this period, the results could have spelled disaster. C28J
The mass-produced ships of World War I, known as "Hog Islanders,"
3

provided us with a fleet not suitable for peacetime operations; and a
policy of recapture of investment through liquidation was advocated.
The lesson had not yet been learned, and no provision was made for a
long-range program to meet future emergency requirements. The period
of 1922-1936 saw hardly any activity in American shipyards.
A slump in shipping during the world-wide depression in the 1930 's
brought the United States merchant fleet again to a dangerously low
level. In 1936, our merchant marine was fourth among the six leading
maritime nations in tonnage, sixth in vessels ten years of age or less,
and fifth in vessels with speeds of 12 knots or over.
This same period brought only stop-gap government aid tied to
ocean mail and similar subsidy programs. These on-again, off-again
political subterfuges failed to assure shipowners that it was sound
to invest in the American shipping industry. The American Merchant
Marine had operated under competitive conditions that had at times
virtually removed the American flag from the seas; and, in 193!?*
President Roosevelt called upon Congress to openly recog^ze the fact
that our Merchant Marine needed outright financial aid to offset the
lower operating and construction costs of foreign shipowners. The
resulting legislation—the Merchant Marine Act of 1936—is the found-
ation upon which our merchant fleet is today based. Frequently referred
to as the "Magna Carta of the American Merchant Marine," this Act laid
down a clear national policy for the maintenance and preservation of
an American-flag fleet of sufficient size to carry our water-borne
commerce and capable, also, of serving as a defense force in time of
national emergency.
Outright financial assistance was to be provided through con-
h

struction and operating-differential subsidy programs under the
direction of the United States Maritime Commission which was established
as an independent government agency to take over the functions of the
Shipping Board and modernize the American Merchant Marine. The Com-
1
mission limited the coastal, intercoastal and noncontiguous trades to
American "bottoms" and set forth 23 world-trade routes considered
essential to our national economy. These routes formed the basis, as
in the operating-subsidy program for much of the government's assistance
to the Merchant Marine.
With the help of private industry, the Commission designed three
basic types of cargo ships easily adaptable to the requirements of
the various trade routes and suitable for use as naval auxiliaries,
should the need arise. These provisions designed to place our pri-
vately-owned merchant fleet on an equal footing with foreign competition
were long overdue.
Acknowledgement of the requirement for a long-range shipbuilding
program also came at this time in the form of a program aimed at the
construction of £0 freighters per year for a ten year period. It
was fortunate that the ground work had been laid, for the first results
of this program coincided with the beginning of World War II. Even
though emergency measures were necessarily resorted to in providing
the shipping demanded by the war, the 1936 Act had provided the frame-
work within which the expansion of the shipping industry to gigantic
proportions was made possible. There is no question of the high value
of the programs initiated by the 1936 Act to the World War II defense
1
The offshore or Hawaiian, Puerto Rican and Alaskan trades.

effort.
Before the program was well started, World War II broke out in
Europe. Again as in World War I, ships vere in tremendous demand.
The number of ships to be built -was doubled and redoubled.
With the aid of experienced shipyard management and employees,
new shipyards were built and thousands of new workers were trained.
Within a year and a half after the United States entered the war
in 19lilj the shipyards were building ships more quickly than the enemy
was able to sink them. From 19U2-19U5* United States shipyards built
5,592 merchant ships of which 2,701 were Liberty ships, Iilh were the
faster Victory type, 6lf> were tankers, Ul7 were standard cargo ships
of the "C-type", and the remaining 1,I|09 were military or minor types.
These ships were constructed at a cost in excess of $12 billion. C28^]
These war-built vessels were designed for one purposes mass production;
and such shortcomings as the low efficiency of the reciprocating steam
engine in the "Liberty" left much to be desired if these vessels had
been intended to operate in a competitive economy, but simplicity was
one of their prime advantages in training crews and providing spare
parts. These vessels were the backbone of our fleet during the war,
and they served their purpose well. A million-and-a-half tons of
shipping was kept busy just by the operation at Normandy.
Actual entry of the United States into the war and the subsequent
need for a government organization to coordinate the military and
civilian efforts in providing shipping services culminated in the
formation of the War Shipping Administration with the chairman of the
Maritime Commission acting as administrator. Broad powers were given
to the administrator as required by the gravity of the situation; and
6

in cooperation with Great Britain, maximum and efficient utilization
was made of available vessels.
The end of the war brought many serious problems. Chief among
these was what to do with the excess war-built ships no longer needed
for peaceful enterprise. Another was our agreement with Britain by
which we had assumed responsibility for all wartime ship construction,
thereby depleting her of a postwar fleet which she, along with most of
the other countries of the world, desperately needed to restore their
peacetime economies.
The Ship Sales Act of 19U6 was enacted to cope with these problems
and followed the policy set forth in the Merchant Marine Act of 1936
by establishing a reserve fleet and allowing for the sale or charter
of war-built vess-els to United States citizens. Sale to foreign
interests was permitted for those vessels determined to be;
(l) "unnecessary to the defense of the United States" and (2) "un-
essential to the merchant marine." Of the 5,592 war-built vessels,
I
r
700 had been lost, 6U0 scrapped because of heavy damage and the other
li,2£2 disposed of by the Act. About 1,300 of the Victory and "C-type"
class were sold to American shipowners, and over 2,000 went into the
reserve fleet. C28H
During this period the Maritime Commission undertook a resurvey
of the trade routes deemed essential to the postwar economy of the
United States, and designated 31 routes on which financial assistance
in the form of operating subsidies could be made available to offset
the differential costs of foreign operators in maintaining regular
schedules of American vessels. This figure has climbed to 3U at the
present time, plus three additional round-the-world eastbound and west-
7

bound services considered essential to our foreign commerce.
The world situation after World War II did not permit a return to
the long-range program envisioned by the Merchant Marine Act of 1936.
A large foreign-aid program together with a general shortage of
competitive shipping throughout the world bolstered our private fleets;
and, although other nations pursued a policy of heavy shipbuilding, we
fell back on our war-built vessels to satisfy our shipping needs. This
action set the stage for block obsolescence of our fleet by the mid
1960's.
In 19h9> unification of military ocean-shipping operations took
place in the creation of the Military Sea Transportation Service,
aimed at consolidating all functions of the Army Transport Service and
the Navy Transport Service, now under a Navy single-manager system.
Shortly thereafter, in early 19^0, President Truman's Reorganization
Plan 21 brought about abolishment of the independent Maritime Commission
and transfer of its duties and responsibilities to a three-member
Federal Maritime Board and a Maritime Administration under the Depart-
ment of Commerce. When the Korean conflict broke out, this agency was
just being organized; and it lacked the necessary authority to imple-
ment emergency measures to meet the demand for shipping. MSTS,
however, stepped in with a nucleus fleet of Yflx vessels and rapidly
expanded by chartering and using over 1*00 vessels from private and
reserve fleets to meet the crisis. C7D
The Defense Production Act of 19f>0 established a National
Shipping Authority similar to the War Shipping Administration of World
War II; and under Maritime Administration jurisdiction, it took control
of the shipping functions, thereby relieving MSTS of much of the
8

pressure. During the period of the Korean conflict, from July, 1950,
to October, 1902, over 32 million tons of supplies and over 1 million
personnel -were carried in its support.
World War II and Korea proved the value of shipping to national
defense just as the Spanish-American War and World War I had. Never-
theless, a declining trend has again been established. Significant
increases in United States commercial foreign trade since 1900 have
shown the same growth trend as general economic activity in the United
States. The American Merchant Marine's share in the transportation of
United States trade has however declined markedly. United States flag
ships have, with the exception of World War II and the immediate post
war years, carried less than half of our water-borne commerce by
weight.
Prior to the war years, American vessels carried between 2$ and 3£
per cent by weight of American water-borne foreign trade, but in the
post war years their share has declined almost steadily fren^a high of
about two-thirds of the total in \9h$ to a low in 1963 of about 10 per
cent. (See Table 1.) The percentage data does however conceal the
effects of the marked growth of the American foreign trade" since 1900.
Although their percentage^tehare has steadily fallen, the absolute
tonnage carried by the United States carriers has not shown a consis-
tant decline but has fluctated moderately. (See Figure 1.) Therefore,
the decrease in the American share results not from a decline in the
traffic carried in the United States flag ships, but from the increase
in tonnage carried by ships under foreign registry. This increase is
keeping pace with the growth of our foreign trade and economic activity.




WATER-HORN E IMPORTS AND EXPORTS
PER CENT BY UNITED STATES FLAG
(In millions of short tons)
Total Total Total
Year Trade % U.S. Imports % U.S. Exports % U.S.
1935 81 31.7 38 1*1.6 1*3 22.9
191*0 106 28.7 15 38.8 61 21.2
191*5 101 68. 1* 39 79.7 62 61.2
1950 159 39.3 97 U3.7 63 32.5
1952 210 3U.3 107 38.8 103 29.5
1953 200 29.0 119 32.3 81 2l*.l
195U 199 27.5 121 30.1 78 23.5
1955 25U 23.5 111 26.5 113 19.6
1956 306 21.9 160 2U.8 1U5 18.9
1957 338 18.8 172 20.1 166 17.5
1958 290 13.5 176 11.7 115 16.3
1959 308 12.0 200 9.6 108 16.1*
I960 323 12.3 199 9.9 121 16.3
1961 315 10.6 188 8.1 128 1U.1*
1962 31*5 11.0 211 8.7 131* lli.6
1963 369 9.9 213 7-lt 156 13.1*





1950 '$1 '$2 j'53 •$!* »# '& '57 F5i '$9 '60 '61 «62 '63
FIGURE 1
TOTAL U.S. FOREIGN TRADE AND THE VOLUME CARRIED
ON U.S. FLAG SHIPS
(1950 - 1963)
(BASED ON DATA; FROM STATISTICAL ABSTRACT
OF THE UNITED STATES 196U)
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American Merchant Marine. This was a determining factor in 1936 legis-
lation and again in 19^0 when the Maritime Administration asked for
Congressional appropriations for 35 "Mariner-class" vessels, 20 knot,,
13,000 deadweight ton ships. This $3^0 million program was a great
disappointment in many respects. Although the building of these ships
kept the shipyards busy and strengthened our defense posture because
of their excellent design and built-in features, the" did not fit into
commercial use as readily as anticipated. Except for a few under
government contracts, high cost of operation steered most Mariners
into the reserve fleets within a short time.
The Long Range Shipping Act of 19^2 was another attempt at
"Encouraging and strengthening our merchant fleet. It offered broader
tax benefits to non-subsidized operators, limited mortgage liability
in purchases of passenger vessels and reduced the trade-in age for
vessels to 12 years old. Success of this plan has been hampered by
limited availability of federal funds for construction assistance,




THE MERCHANT MARINE AND
NATIONAL ECONOMY
In the last third of the twentieth century, the nuclear age, it is
probable that consideration of the United States Merchant Marine's
value will be more closely associated with political-economic require-
ments rather than military-political requirements. The United States
Merchant Marine will be employed not only to promote United States
international commerce, but also to further national objectives by
showing the flag, carrying aid to underdeveloped countries, delivering
products of the economy to world-wide ports, and in particular, insuring
that the United States has national control of its sea transport capa-
bilities needed to support the United States economic base. The concept
of military needs for merchant ships will be encompassed by the broader
definition of national goals and policies. Hitch and McKean, in their
book, "The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age", Ql2j discuss the
potential threat to our nation. They feel that the greatest threat to
the United States is either participation in political-economic
struggles, or, engagement in limited and localized conflicts throughout
the world, rather than all out the rmo-nuclear war. If these are indeed
the threats, then the role of the shipping industry -would be to prepare
the merchant marine to handle limited emergencies, and, possibly more
important in the long run, to provide service to the ports of under-
developed nations equally with the service being given by those ships
of the Communist bloc.
Transportation by water has been historically the least costly
13

mode of moving the products of the -world trade, and development of
commercial centers at geographical locations favorable to the maritime
industry is proof of the influence of shipping upon both the domestic
and international commerce of all nations. Ocean shipping encourages
world trade by providing a cheap means for capitalizing on international
specialization and must be thought of as an economic service normally
available but, nevertheless, subject to the laws of supply and demand
as any commodity would be. It is in the interest of every nation to
take advantage of world markets ; and the United States, as the leader
in world trade, is highly dependent upon her own merchant fleet as a
pipeline to carry the flow of products and goods necessary to maintain
its economy. However, many foreign governments have participated in
"unfair trade practices" against the American shipping industry. They
have employed a variety of devices to accomplish this end. Among these
are the following* exchange control, preferential berthing arrangements
for other foreign flag vessels, discriminatory pilotage and docking
fees for American ships, and regulations requiring the use of foreign
customs brokers when American shipping companies had branch offices
capable of taking care of these matters. Qll^
To discourage these forementioned discriminatory practices, the
government of the United States should take an active part in trade
conferences regulating such malpractices. It must be prepared to
support our shipping industry by exercising its influence as a world
power at such conferences, and at intergovernmental negotiations con-
cerning this problem. Discrimination against United States shippers
can best be countered by negotiations by the government to eliminate
these practices, rather than by exercising counter discriminatory
11

measures. Active parti , a program
requires a determination of specific areas in which the government
might be of assistance to the private shipping industry.
The United States is virtually 100 per cent dependent upon ocean
shipping for its export-import trade. Inroads have been made into use
of air transport, but, bulk shipments of material depend on the reli-
able merchant ship. The United States is today the world's greatest
importer and exporter. Almost half of the world's output of raw
materials and more than a third of the total industrial pxoduction of
the world are now channeled to the needs of the American economy.
The growth of American industry is such that its needs have out-
grown its domestic supply base. The country is no longer self-
sufficient in natural resources except f< i cultural
commodities. The United Stat* s has great deficiencies in tin, man-
ganese, chromite, and bauxite; and has become the world's largest
importer of copper, lead and zinc, whereas we were once large exporters.
More than I4O of the 72 strategic and critical commodities listed by
the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization are entirely imported,
as are portions of the rest. \j!~3 The aluminum industry acquires 85 per
cent of its bauxites through ocean shipping, and 85 per cent of the
manganese and 35 per cent of the iron ore used in making steel comes
to this country by waters Increasingly the United States looks to
Canada, Latin America. Africa, the Near East, and South and Southeast
Asia for larger quantities of raw materials . C9^J
The continued and competitive expansion of American industry
depends heavily on these import "aw materials from the primary
producers which are found largely in the underdeveloped nations of
15

the world. It is important to remember that these imports reach the
United States almost solely by ocean-borne commerce. Exports are
equally important, and it is the merchant marine which provides our
industry and agriculture with a means by which they can expand their
world markets. Exports account for over 17 per cent of our output
in cotton production, almost 30 per cent of our wheat, and 19 per
cent of our machinery. [J?3 while ships themselves may be secondary in
the creation of trade, continuity of shipping services is of great
importance to the development of foreign trade. Where American flag
ships have serviced trade routes regularly, they have definitely been
a stimulant to the creation of trade. In this role, our shipping
fleets serve as an instrument of our national policy and aid us in
building our prosperity and raising our standards of living.
By maintaining control of a minimum amount of shipping under the
American flag, the government cans (1) ensure coverage of all trade
routes considered essential to our foreign commerce, (2) insure con-
tinuity of service to shippers, and (3) protect American shippers
against discriminatory practices of foreign interests.
This is done under our free-enterprise system through the use of
operating-differential subsidies which are paid to private shipping
companies to offset the added expense of labor, maintenance, and
safety features which foreign competitors do not have . On June 30,
196U, 18 ship operators held operating-differential subsidies on 318
vessels out of 587 United States-flag merchant ships serving actively
in our foreign trade. The annual cost to the government for operating-
differential subsidies is approximately $99 million. C26^)
Aid to the ship operators alone has not been sufficient to
16

maintain the high standards set by the government for vessels flying
the American flag, and a program of ship-construction subsidies has
also been undertaken to ensure a fleet of modern ships capable of
economic operation in a highly competitive business. This program
recognizes the difference in costs between shipbuilding in foreign
countries and the United States grants subsidies up to 5>0 per cent of
the total cost of the vessel, less the cost of any built-in defense
features deemed appropriate by the Navy Department, which are addition-
ally paid for by the government. Construction-differential subsidies
in the fiscal-year l°6li (including reconstruction) was over $88 million,
and costs of national-defense features paid for by the government
exceeded $300,000. Q.D
Federal assistance to our private merchant fleets takes other
forms as well, such as the provisions in law requiring that at least
£0 per cent of government cargoes must be carried in American-flag
vessels. American-ship operators are also favored by legislation
allowing participation in rate-setting conferences normally considered
to be illegal and in restraint of trade under our free-enterprise
system. The government agency established to administer these programs
and carry out the policies of the government with regard to the
American Merchant Marine is the Maritime Administration, acting under
delegation of authority by the Secretary of Commerce.
The American Merchant Marine has more impact on our economy than
may be generally realized for, besides a large fleet of ships, crews,
and shipyards, it consists of office and port facilities, cargo-
handling equipment, warehouses, and a host of other related activities.
The sea and shore operations and the shipbuilding activities alone
17

contribute over $2.8 billion a year to our Gross National Product.
Related domestic transportation warehousing, handling, and port
operations are estimated to contribute more than $3 billion; and fuel
oil, stores, food, and other consumables account for another $5>00
million a year. In the passenger business, American-flag ships
provide over 20 per cent of the ocean passenger service for travellers
between the United St#tes and Europe; and the names of such vessels as
the UNITED STATES, CONSTITUTION, and INDEPENDENCE are known throughout
the world. QoU
Shipbuilding plays an especially important part in our economy;
and at the end of fiscal-year 196a there were liij vessels under con-
struction, conversion, or reconversion in United States privately-
owned shipyards, with a contract value of over $a91 million. Under
a government insured loan and mortgage program aimed at increasing
private financing of ship construction, the Maritime Administration
reported 19 ships financed for a value of $85 million as of June 30,
1961i; and eight applications were pending at that time for another
$152 million for construction of 28 ships. [JLU
American-flag lines spend over $7 million each year on electrical
products, $3 million on china and glassware, and $2 million on linen;
and it is estimated that the American Merch«&t Marine is directly
responsible for a total of 250,000 employed people which includes
seagoing personnel, longshoremen, dock employees, and shipyard workers.
As far back as 1959, $u9 million was spent on fuel and $k0
million on subsistence and stores. Insurance and repairs also amounted
to $u0 million and $32 million respectively. The merchant marine
employed over 60,000 citizens on board ship, and the supporting
18

shipbuilding industry employed in excess of 100,000 ivorkers. The same
year stevedoring and other cargo handling services cost $165 million.QlOl]
These figures are evidence of the impact of the merchant marine
on the economy of the United States; and it is evident that the scope
of the government's programs with regarji to the merchant marine are
large, costly, and have far-reaching economic effects. Formulating
policy, establishing regulations, and implementing controls for the




POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS
There is no doubt but that the primary reasoning behind much of
the legislation and actual appropriation of public funds in favor of
the American Merchant Marine lies in the potential of shipping as a
defense force—a so-called "fourth arm of defense" <> In recent years
however, the value of ocean shipping in event of either limited or
all-out nuclear war has been seriously questioned. These arguments
frequently state that loss of port facilities would : Ize
whatever shipping was available, and nartime pooling of allied
shipping under NATO or other alliances would be sufficient to adequa-
tely meet any emergency needs. We have only to look at the Lebanon
crisis to assure ourselves that the flag vessels of some of our allies
would not be welcome in all instances , or review the Suez emergency
for proof that we cannot depend on foreign shipping—even that of our
allies. History shows that today's friend may be tomorrow's enemy,
and there may be more to be gained through use of shipping as a defense
in the cold war than in either a limited or all-out nuclear struggle
.
Determination of limits of spending for defense is one of the
biggest problems facing our nation. The usual approach is to attempt
to match the capability of the opposition, or at least to be able to
compare figures with him in some aspect of mutual forces. Communist
use of shipping to undermine freight rates in competition with free-
world shipping could lead to serious consequences by "railroading"
vital cargoes and disrupting established trade. How large our
American Merchant Marine should be, and to what extent it should be
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supported by federal aid are questions of primary interest. In order
to "know our enemy" and resolve these problems, it is essential to
include Communist shipping within the scope of study.
The Soviet development of its merchant shipping has run a close
parallel to its well-known long-range program for submarine development.
Thus, the Soviet Union has shown recognition of the power to be gained
from control and use of the seas in both peace and war. Soviet
capability to carry but 10 per cent of its ocean trade in the 1930'
s
had jumped to more than £0 per cent by 1957- At the latter time
American-flag vessels were carrying less than 19 per cent of all
American ocean-going cargoes. C^U
Recent entrance of the Soviet Union into the ship-charter market,
offering attractive prices when advantageous for them to do so,
points out the possible implications that unethical practices could
have in the field of ocean shipping. Full control of Soviet-flag
shipping by a central government agency allows such strategies as
operating at financial losses to gain political advantages and making
1
maximum use of shipping programs in propaganda efforts. A good example
of the latter has been shown in publicizing the delivery of goods to
underdeveloped nations in Soviet vessels. The Soviets pass up no
opportunity to use discriminatory practices, and trade agreements
with the Soviet Union can usually be found to include stipulations
calling for a substantial amount of participation by Soviet merchant
ships. This has been seen recently in Cuba. Close coordination
1
The primary role of the Soviet Merchant Marine is economic, but




between maritime, political, and economic objectives can be expected
in all future Soviet policy formulation.
On June 30, 1961;, the American Merchant Marine had an active
fleet of 886 vessels of almost 15 million dead-weight tons, and an
inactive fleet of l,7h5 vessels. In comparison the Soviet Union,
which has no reserve fleet, had 1,11*9 active vessels with 7«3 million
deadweight tons. (See Tables 2 and 3«) Satellite flags fly^on more
than another U«2 million deadweight tons of shipping, and Communist
China is able to contribute another modest three-fourths million under
its flag. This total of roughly 12 million deadweight tons of Sino-
Soviet-bloc shipping accounts, however, for only 6 per cent of the
shipping controlled by countries under NATO and which can be assumed
to be available to the free world in case of the outbreak of hostilities.
Under a seven-year plan inaugurated in 1958, the Soviet
merchant fleet was scheduled to double in size by 1965. A strong
Soviet fleet of the size targeted for, could have an untold and serious
impact on free-world trade and economics. Current Soviet plans call
for a merchant fleet of from 20 to 25 million deadweight tons by 1980.
Assuming a continuation of the present building program and additions
to the fleet of nearly 1 million deadweight tons annually, this objec-
tive should be met with relative ease. One problem that presently
faces them is lack of standardization in existing vessels. Much of
their present fleet is a conglomeration of vessels (some of which even
burn coal); and there is a wide variety of foreign design and con-
struction in evidence, including 83 lend-lease tankers never returned
to the United States after World War II. Qll*]




SELECTED MERCHANT FLEETS OF THE WORLD
Number of Ocean-going Vessels and Deadweight Tons
Vessels of at least 1,000 Gross Tons
June 30, 1961





and Cargo Freighter Bulk Tanker
Total-All 18,072 1,097 11,087 1,779 3,159
U. S. 2,631 267 1,898 78 388
U. K. 2,168 105 1,092 276 509
China (Red) 16$ 19 107 18 18
Cuba 33 — 30 1 2
France 8U 1*6 281 61 157
Germany Qh9 18 65k 68 hi
Greece 8U7 U2 611 82 100
Israel 73 1 55 7 2
Italy 607 73 286 90 11*3
Japan 1,266 28 828 162 210
Liberia 1,056 9 1*25 197 1*22
Norway 1,382 2k 6L5 208 Itfli
Panama 5U6 16 3U6 33 ll*l*
Sweden 1*97 10 283 79 90
U.S.S.R. 1,11*9 75 65k 162 191
Source: Annual Report of the Federal Maritime Board and Maritime





EMPLOYMENT OF UNITED STATES-FLAG
MERCHANT SHIPS
Number of Ocean-going Vessels and Deadweight Tons




United States Foreign Trade £87
Maritime Administration 33
Panama Canal Company 2
Privately Owned 552
United States Domestic Trade 2$9
Maritime Administration 3
Privately Owned 296





Maritime Administration Reserve Fleet 1>65>6
Sources Annual Report of the Federal Maritime Board and Maritime
Adminis tration 1961;. Q13




come up against. Manning and personnel problems are also a source of
troubleSMo the Soviets. Soviet programs are now aimed at educating
and training both seagoing and shores ide maritime personnel, and at
standardizing design in shipbuilding in attempting to overcome these
obstacles to the long-range plan for merchant shipping. Emphasis is
being placed on large, fast more sophisticated ships. Considerable
additional emphasis is being placed on shipboard automation, and on the
development of mechanical devices designed to increase productivity in
cargo handling. Appearance of modern, well-constructed vessels on
the high seas, information on use of latest shipbuilding techniques in
Soviet shipyards, and increasing Soviet interest in ocean shipping
should not be shrugged off lightly. Cl^H
Between 195U and 1957* the Soviets undertook a crash program
aimed at turning out one tanker a month. This program has now tapered
off to five a year, but present heavy reliance on chartering of tanker
capacity to help carry its increased exports of petroleum products
cannot be expected to continue and may well cause a new increase in
production of vessels
.
The American Merchant Marine today is the largest in the world,
numbering almost 3,000 vessels of well over 30 million deadweight tons.
(See Table 2.) In addition to this, there are over 500 United States-
owned vessels registered under "flags of convenience", including about
2
half of the total of the United States-owned tanker fleet. The
2
Registry of vessels under foreign flags is an attempt to avoid




government, through agreements with the owners of "flag of convenience"
vessels, assures the availability of these vessels to the United States
in time of war. These vessels now carry about 27 per cent of our
foreign trade. Coupled with the almost 10 per cent carried by
American-flag vessels, we can be said to carry less than half of our
foreign commerce in United States-Controlled ships—all of which should
be available in event of war. Presently under pressure from maritime
unions at home and foreign competitive interests abroad, our fleet of
"flag of convenience" vessels provides a substantial "force-in-being"
from the defense point of view. Return of these ships to United States
registry in peacetime would drive them from the sea and weaken our sea
power. The "flag of convenience" ships are modern (over half being
less than nine-years old), fast, and efficient, accounting for IjO per
cent of our government-controlled active merchant fleet. It is
important to note that these vessels are not subsidized and are, there-
fore, no direct burden on our government's expenditures for defense. L79Z1
On June 30, 1961i, there were l,7h£ inactive vessels in our
merchant fleet, 1,656 of which were in a reserve-fleet status. A
large portion or about 1,200 of these vessels are Liberty ships; and a
government program to scrap a target figure of 1,000 of these 11-knot
vessels in near-readiness status has been undertaken, but not without
much criticism. Maintenance costs of reserve-fleet vessels run about
$3*000 a ship per year, or over £.2 million last year. The fact that.
Ii3U Liberties were reactivated for the Korean crisis should serve as a
reminder of their value, and act to deter such a move. Liberties could
be a most useful asset in any limited war where supply lines are
considered inviolate. In such a case, their slow speed, normally
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considered a great disadvantage against submarines, is not a critical
factor. Also included in the reserve fleets are approximately 300
Victory ships with a 17-knot service speed and over l£0 transport-type
vessels, also in this higher-speed range. C^U
Block obsolescence now threatens our active tramp fleet of 700-
odd vessels, most of which are also Liberties and whjch do not receive
operating-differential subsidies. The forced set-aside of funds from
subsidized-line revenues for vessel replacement at today's shipbuilding
costs appears to be somewhat inadequate. If subsidized operators
will not be able to replace their vessels under current programs, it
can hardly be expected that non-subsidized operators would be in any
better position to replace their vessels fast approaching retirement
age.
The government's present replacement program centers around the
subsidized-operator agreements to replace 282 vessels over a long-
range period which extends into the 1970' s. Present schedules
minimize the mid-1960's 20 year obsolescence threat, and plans for the
next three years call for about 3U ships per year. Much of these and
the non-subsidized fleet-replacement program depend on availability of
government funds for the estimated $0 per cent of the construction
costs to be shared by the government, plus the total costs of any
defense features. CO
Speed of merchant vessels is important from the defense viewpoint
in considering vulnerability to submarine attack. It is considered
that a significant advantage is gained at speeds in excess of 2£ knots.
At present there are only three United States commercially-operated
passenger ships in this class? the CONSTITUTION, the INDEPENDENCE, and
27

the UNITED STATES. The average cargo vessel operates in the Ik to
16 knot range. Even the NS SAVANNAH is only designed for a modest
21 knots.
There is no doubt that the prime reason necessitating government
aid to maintain an American-flag fleet stems from the high cost of
American labor, and it is estimated that from 7£ to 8£ per cent of
wage costs are paid for by the government, subsidies. This high cost is
borne in return for preserving a hard core of personnel needed to
build and man our ships in emergencies. World War II increased the
number of shipyard employees to ten times the prewar level and more
than tripled the seagoing personnel. From a defense viewpoint, ships
alone are not enough; and lack of trained personnel could be a major
problem. United States-owned vessels operated under "flags of con-
venience" could face a serious manning problem if these vessels were
recalled to the American flag or put under account for our government.
American wages paid to seagoing personnel are three times those
paid to their counterparts on foreign-flag vessels. (See Table' lj.)
The high pay received by seamen puts them in the upper wage scale of
American labor. According to an American Merchant Marine Institute
Research Report, an able-bodied seaman earns over $700 a month on a
typical United States-flag C-2 vessel. This includes overtime and
employer contributions to funds, but does not include payroll taxes,
subsistence and lodging, transportation and accident insurance. There
appears to be justification behind the argument that high wages are
driving ships away from the American flag. Is it any wonder that "one
of the largest unions of unlicensed seamen has almost twice as many




AVERAGE DAILY OPERATING COSTS C-2 VESSEL
VARIOUS FLAGS - ESTIMATES 1961
United States Britain ^Germany
Wages $1,231* $353 $300
Subsistence 96 80 78
Stores, Supplies and Equipment 100 92 88
Repairs and Maintenance 230 138 151
Insurance 210 155 206
Miscellaneous Uo 21 - 21
Total Expenses ! fa, 9io $81*2 *8U1*
Fuel-Steaming $609 $609 $609
Fuel-In Port $120 $120 $120
Source: Seafaring Premium Pay. Maritime Administration 19^. £23]
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Labor-management relations in the maritime industry are notor-
iously poor. The Maritime Administration reports that last year
prolonged strikes hampered operations in no less than eight large
shipyards. Racketeering and jurisdictional disputes in maritime unions
have brought nothing but public wrath upon the industry, and it is
difficult to find signs of improvement. With so many union men avail-
able, it is very discouraging and difficult to recruit new talent into
a career which holds little opportunity even for the most enterprising.
For mobilization purposes, shipbuilding and repair facilities are
obviously important. Presently there are 26 commercial shipyards
considered of sufficient size to have mobilization value. Besides the
127 shipbuilding ways in these yards, there is a capacity for more at
government-owned reserve shipyards. Allocation of many of these ways
has been made to the Navy if needed, so only the balance of them
would be available for construction of merchantmen. There are also
approximately 100 drydocks capable of handling vessels of at least a
li77-foot length. The Navy owns 37 of these, pj
The backbone of the mobilization effort for ocean shipping is,
without question, the Military Sea Transportation Service. In any
emergency, large or small, this organization would be the first to
swing into action and absorb the full initial impact of the heavy
demands of war. Charged with the responsibility to provide ocean trans-
portation for Department of Defense cargoes and personnel, MSTS plans
and arranges for commercial shipping services needed bo augment its
own nucleus fleet of some 100 odd vessels. As of September 1, 1°6U,
there were k3 vessels in the MSTS Commercial Fleet. One of MSTS's
tasks is to plan for and be capable of rapid expansion to meet the
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demands of any emergency. MSTS enjoys a fine reputation in the mari-
time industry, although it has been under attack as a competitor with
with commercial shipping interests on numerous occasions. A joint
agreement with the Maritime Administration ensures use of United States-
flag ships where available to augment nucleus MSTS vessels. The
question has always been how large the nucleus MSTS force should be to
meet DOD requirements without infringing upon the rights of commercial
vessels to carry government cargoes; and there has, as yet, been no
satisfactory answer. CllH
There are many "ifs" in determining a suitable size for a merchant
marine that will support our national needs. With emphasis on the
defense requirements, estimates of the tonnage that we should maintain
in our active fleet range from ten to over 20 million deadweight tons .QlH
This is comparable to a range of between 1,000 and 2,000 vessels.
From number of ships now available under United States control, the
surplus of seagoing personnel and the available facilities, no critical
situation can be assumed to exist.
There are however, many problems to be faced and solved if we are
to maintain our relatively strong maritime position in the world of
tomorrow. Among these ares
1. the present reality of block obsolescence,
2. the loss of United States controlled vessels
through reduction in "flag of convenience" fleets,
3. the depressed labor-management relations in the
maritime industry, and,
h' the tendency to cut financial assistance to
Merchant Marine in time of peace.
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Government policy and provisions for assistance to the private
shipping industry have been set forth in various Merchant Marine Acts
through the years, and an examination of the legislation is considered
pertinent in determining if it is adequate to meet our needs of the
future. As Ralph E. Casey, former President of the American Merchant
,
Marine Institute, put it:
The maritime industry is aware of most, if not all,
of its own problems, and in many cases we know the solu-
tion. The difficulty arises when we seek the necessary





Formulating maritime policy was an important government function
in the days following the American Revolution, but legislation was
generally defensive in nature and designed primarily to counter the
discriminatory practices of other maritime nations . It was «arly
established in legislation, however, that all American-documented
vessels would be built domestically and that foreign-flag vessels would
be excluded from American intercoastal commerce. Our shipping industry
was flourishing and highly active in the markets of the world, and
needed little help from government in maintaining its strong competitive
position. Other countries, not so fortunate, found it necessary to
give direct aid to their fleets, and resorted to mail subsidies for
this purpose. By mid-nineteenth century, the foreign-built iron
steamer had become a strong contender with the American-built wooden
sailing vessel; and, following the lead of others, we too turned to
the mail-subsidy concept. We used these measures from l8ii7 to 1857 and
again from 186)4 to 1877 > but they were ineffective and proved to be of
little practical benefit.
The period from 1891 to World War I was again a time in which was
certainly recognized that the American Merchant Marine was inadequate
to meet the demands of commerce and defense, but again, only the mail
subsidies were used. The primary reason for not having an effective
maritime program was that public opinion frowned on any large-scale use
of public funds to underwrite a comparatively small segment of private
enterprise. Many people could see no reason for supporting a national
33

merchant fleet and felt the funds could be better used elsewhere. To
show how meager was the government's policy of assistance during the
early part of the century, consider the indirect and vague wording of
the Ocean Mail Act of 1891, upon which the whole industry existed.
It stated only that mail contracts should "subserve and promote the
postal and commercial interests of the United States." This was
certainly no realistic appreciation of so grave a problem for a nation*
which was about to enter a struggle for its very survival. Although
this period saw many bills presented before Congress and the launching
of many investigations, no specific merchant marine program was forth-
coming until passage of the comprehensive Shipping Act of 1916.
This act created the United States Shipping Board and authorized
it to form a corporation (known as the Emergency Fleet Corporation)
to procure the necessary vessels to serve the nation's wartime
shipping requirements. In addition to its proprietary functions, the
board, as an independent government agency, was assigned regulatory
responsibilities in connection with American ship-operator participation
in ocean shipping rate-setting conferences. Shipping conferences were,
by this time, recognized as being essential to the industry and exempt
from antitrust legislation. The regulatory provisions of the Act
required notification be given the government whenever rate agreements
were entered into or changed, but did not provide for any direct
government participation in setting the rates—only approval, dis-
approval, or cancellation. American shippers currently deal with well
over 100 conferences, and some American-ship operators belong to as
many as 20 of them.
As amended, the Act required government approval of any change of
3U

vessel ownership to foreign interests or change of its documentation to
a foreign flag. In emergency situations, shipbuilding and related
facilities could be brought within the scope of the Act, thereby
ensuring priority of national interests. Present-day Maritime Admin-
istration policy in considering requests for transfer to foreign flag,
or sale to foreign interests, takes into account national-defense
requirements as well as national commercial needs j and, generally
speaking, it is approved only in cases of vessels over 20 years of age,
or where effective control of the vessel will remain with the United
States . Sale or transfer vf flag vessels less than 20 years old is
made possible where the present owner agrees to build a replacement
vessel, meeting Maritime Administration specifications, in an American
shipyard for American registry. The 1916 Act is very much a part of
present day legislation and, although long in coming, can only be
regarded as an emergency measure taken in view of the imminence of war
at the time of its enactment. C26]D
The Merchant Marine Act of 1920 repealed some of the World War I
emergency legislative measures, and had, as one of its primary purposes,
the sale of the war-built vessels | but, more important, it "embodied
the first definitive statement of government policy under which aid
could be given the American Merchant Marine". Q173 It stated:
It is necessary for the national defense and for the proper
growth of its foreign and domestic commerce, that the United
States shall have a merchant marine of the best equipped and
most suitable types of vessels sufficient to carry the greater
part of its commerce and serve as a naval or military auxil-
iary in time of war or national emergency, ...and it is
hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to do
whatever may be necessary to develop and encourage the
maintenance of such a merchant marine...
One provision established a $125 million construction-loan fund;
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and, although this particular program was not effective, it set the
stage for later government participation in shipbuilding activities.
Subsidy payments were still tied to the mails, however; and these were
only slightly changed by the 1920 Act. Recognition of certain mortgage
rights, not previously considered valid in admiralty courts, brought
the kind of security needed to induce private investment in ship
construction; but, unfortunately, the surplus of war-built ships,
which the government was unable to sell, offset all measures to build
up the peacetime merchant fleet, and only caused low shipping rates
and a generally depressed industry.
The Merchant Marine Act of 1928 was another attempt to break the
bottleneck of obsolescence created by the excess of World War I fleet;
but even with its provisions for doubling the size of the origional
construction-loan fund, and broadening of the mail-subsidy program, a
total of only 57 vessels was built under the provisions of both of
these Acts. Ocean-mail provisions of the Act of 1928 were made con-
tingent upon the ability of vessels to meet certain national-defense
requirements. Eligibility required vessels to meet plan and specif-
ication criteria approved by the Secretary of the Navy, or to be shown
useful to the nation in time of emergency. Other mail-subsidy require-
ments were that at least one-half of the crew had to be United States
citizens, vessel documentation was to remain under the American flag
for at least 20 years, and the vessels were subject to priority control
by the United States for national-defense purposes if the need arose.
The 1928 Act was found to have its shortcomings, however; and these
were brought out in the Magnuson committee report in 19^0. Cl7U
First the compensation granted American lines was not
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based upon actual conditions encountered on the partic-
ular route served, so that some lines got more than they
needed, while others competing with subsidized foreign
companies were given too little aid. Second, the ship
replacement provisions were somewhat too laxly enforced.
Third, loans for shipbuilding were made at varying rates,
so that lucky lines got money at almost nominal interest
charges, while others paid several times as much, creat-
ing an element of unfairness. This, however, was not due
to favoritism, but to legal interpretation of a carelessly
worded section of the act ... Fourth, there was inadequate
supervision over the use to which subsidy money was put by
the lines, officers of one or two companies paying them-
selves bonuses and dividends when their companies were
almost going bankrupt. Fifth, there was complaint that
in violation of law, contracts were so worded that public
bidding was frustrated and only a predetermined line
could comply.
In answer to President Roosevelt's question directed at Congress
in 1935 as to "whether or not the United States should have an adequate
merchant marine", the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 was enacted. This is
today the basic legislation which effectuates the government's policy
of assistance to the American shipping industry. It eliminated the
ineffective mail-subsidy program and replaced it with a positive,
direct, and useful assistance program to be carried out through a
government agency vested with broad powers. Under the present organ-
ization, the Maritime Administrator, as head of the Maritime Adminis-
tration in the Department of Commerce, and chairman of the semi-
independent Federal Maritime Board, is responsible for investigating
and determining ocean services essential to our foreign commerce,
determining the types of vessels to be employed in providing these
services, and setting schedules necessary to maintain regular sailings.
The Federal Maritime Board weighs foreign-government aid to their
respective merchant fleets and determines wage, operating and con-
struction costs in foreign countries for use in authorizing subsidy
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payments to American-flag-vessel operators j and the Maritime Adminis-
tration is charged with administering subsidy contracts, aiding ship
operators through insured loans and mortgages, paying for defense
features in construction, and disposing of vessels traded in as credit
for new construction. C26I]
Historically, subsidies to private shipping interests have been
justified on the ground that a large foreign trade fleet giving
employment to American citizens, contributes to national defense,
assures against an interruption of service in time of war, and promotes
foreign trade by improving the quality of service available to American
businessmen by safegurading them against discrimination.
The maritime ship operating-differential subsidies are the only
Federal programs where the word w si I >pears in the appropriations
title. The word "subsid in the language of the
-ropriations for ship construct] i in the basic legislation
authorizing ship construction-differential subsidies.
Although these progrc. unequivocally subsidies by even
the narrowest cf definitions, it is difficult to set forth simply the
total volume of these maritime grants. This is due to three major
factors—the fact that payments for the construction of a given vessel
extend over several years; because of provisions for recapture and
cancellation of subsidies for several years after the subsidy has
actually been provided; and because of necessary adjustments and
revisions made by the Maritime Administration.
The construction-differential subsidy is intended i d the
shipbuilding industry. The financial assistance may be paid to any
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American-flag owner who builds a ship in a United States shipyard to be
used in the foreign trade of the United States. Basically, the term
means that the Government under certain conditions and limitations
will pay the difference between the cost of constructing a ship in a
United States shipyard and the reasonable and fair estimate of the
cost of constructing the same type of ship in a foreign shipyard.
The law provides that the subsidy paid shall not be in excess of 50
per cent of the domestic construction cost, exclusive of cost of
national defense features
.
Granting of construction-differential subsidies authorized by the
Merchant Marine Act of 1936 is dependent upon many prerequisites.
Among these are the requirements that American-produced supplies and
materials will be used during construction; and, after completion,
the vessel will be used only in foreign trade or round-the-world
operations. To establish a wide national defense mobilization base,
provisions are set forth to permit allocation of work normally reserved
for competitive bidding. This helps maintain a minimum amount of
skilled shipyard workers at various locations throughout the country
and keeps private shipyards open that would otherwise go out of bus-
iness. The present ship building replacement program started in 1955
will provide for replacement of some 299 ships by 1975 at a total
estimated cost of over $ii.5 billion. £9U
Replacement of these ships will require the Government to pay up
to half the cost of the ships plus the cost of the national defense
features. The program will provide an estimated 210,050 man-years




It will provide employment and earnings to industries supporting
the ship building industries. It will result in considerable tax
revenue to the government in the form of income and corporate taxes.
It will assure the replacement of obsolete vessels with modern ships
of American design and construction on a planned schedule of replace-
ment that is designed to avoid peaks and valleys of construction work.
It will assure a retention of a nucleus of American shipbuilding skills
and adequate facilities to meet normal and emergency requirements.
Why are construction-differential subsidies necessary? This
answer lies in the technique of shipbuilding since the construction of
ocean going vessels is not susceptible to mass production methods of
the assembly line. Ordinarily the number of ships to be built is
small. Each one is a "custom job" built to unique specifications as
required by the prospective owners' intended use of the vessel. Even
when each ship is not unique, traditional assembly-line mass production
methods cannot be used. The unit to be manufactured is large and
complicated and cannot be manufactured in the manner of an automohile
or household appliance. When high rates of output are necessary,
multiple—not mass
—
production occurs... The number of yards or sub-
assembly shops is increased, but the "labor-intensive" methods of
manufacture and assembly largely remain. Some improvements in techniques
are fundamentally alike, although there is evidence indicating that
American shipbuilders achieve higher labor productivity than the foreign
shipbuilders do, their superiority is not enough to offset the higher
wage rates they must pay.
At present there are no technical developments in the future that
will enable American shipbuilders to cut costs enough to compete
Uo

successfully in an international market. Shipbuilders in the United
States can retain their workers only by paying wages sufficiently
high to keep them from being employed elsewhere in the economy. How-
ever, by paying these wages, their costs are raised above the inter-
nationally competitive level.
In addition to granting construction subsidies to the operators,
the Federal Maritime Board is authorized to construct vessels for its
own account. In most cases, these vessels are then sold to the
operator at the estimated cost of construction in a foreign yai*d. This
requires larger Congressional appropriations, however, and is less
preferred than the normal methods by which the operator is reimbursed
for the amount of the differential. As an incentive to build new
vessels and remove the obsolete ones from use, the Act provides for
trade-in of vessels at least 12 years old on a basis highly favorable
to the ship operator. The ships traded in are put into the National
Defense Reserve Fleets created by the Merchant Ship Sales Act of 19U6.
This procedure helps keep the Reserve Fleet vessels in a constant
turnover status, thereby allowing for scrapping of only the older
vessels in poorer condition. Determining characteristics of size,
composition, and speed of reserve-fleet vessels!, is a task shared by
the Navy and the Maritime Administration, and is based on the Joint
Chiefs of Staff annual statement of requirements. Reserve-fleet
vessels provide a buffer force of ships and may be chartered to the
account of any government agency or private American citizen. It is
of importance to note that only a small number of tankers are available
in the reserve fleet, and last year numbered less than 100. Congress
provided legislation from 195U-1958 to build up this portion of the
kl

reserve fleet by accepting tankers over ten years old into the trade-
in-and-build program. Other aid has taken the form of deferred taxes
on profits set aside by ship operators for vessel replacement.
One of the most important forms of financial aid provided to the
United States merchant fleet is the operating-differential subsidy.
The term simply means that the Government will pay the difference
between the cost of operating a United States vessel and the cost of
operating the same type of vessel in the same service under compet-
itive foreign flags.
The 1936 Act provides for the use of operating-differential
subsidies for vessels considered essential to maintenance of established
trade routes. These contractsare designed to be of a long-term nature,
but cannot exceed a statutory limit of 20 years and in no way assure
the operator for expenses in which he is at a substantial disadvantage
in competition with foreign vessels in the same trade. Operating-
differential subsidies are undoubtedly the most important single aspect
of government aid to the merchant marine. To be eligible, vessels must
be domestically built according to Maritime Administration and Navy
Department approved plans, and less than 20 years old. Operators of
such vessels must agree to certain contractual conditions. These
include adoption of minimum manning and wage scales established by
the Federal Maritime Board. Recapture of subsidies is possible
through a long-term provision of the Act. An operator must retain
earned profits in excess of 10 per cent for a ten year accounting
period. At the end of the period, he must repay to the government half
of all profits in excess of 10 per cent, up to full amount of the




OPERATING-DIFFERENTIAL SUBSIDIES JANUARY 1, 19U7 TO JUNE 30, 196U
(In millions of dollars)
Calendar Subsidies Recapture Net Payments Payable
year accured Subsidies June 30, 196u
19U7 £ 13 .1*3 $10.22 $ 3.21 $ 3.21 —
19ii8 Hi. 50 13^57 13.57 —
1919 llU.21 11.52 29.69 29.69 —
1950 57.87 9-2JU U8.63 UB.63 —
1951 71.96 25.79 U6.17 U6.17 —
1952 89.36 25.71 63.62 63.62 —
1953 106.29 12.9k 93.35 93.35 —
195U 107.35 2.8U 10U.51 10U.51 —
1955 115. Hi 11.9li 103.20 103.20 —
1956 128.19 22 .UU 105.75 105.52 $ .23
1957 1U7.76 25.36 122.kO 117 .U3 h.97
1958 1U7.11 6. hi 11*0.70 lliO.58 .12
1959 159.52 .Ui 159.09 151.28 U.81
I960 168.06 5.15 162.91 155.77 7.1U
1961 171.73 1.99 169.7U 159.93 9.81
1962 181;. 70 14.15 180.55 166.79 13.76
1963 193.53 (1.25)* 19U.78 175.91 18.87
19614 99.67 ( .21)* 99.91 142.20 57-71
Total $2,03^.07 $193.61; $1,81*1-77 $l,72U-36 •117.Ui
'"!xpe cted rec ap I
U3

throughout the period and is retained by the Government by reducing
subsidy payments.) The Operating-Differential Subsidies paid to
American shipping companies during the calendar years 19h7 through
1961 are listed in Table 5- ClD
During these years the actual difference between subsidizable
expenses of United States vessels and their foreign competitors
amounted to $2 billion. Of this amount, $192 million has been or may
be "recaptured" by the Government. Accordingly for the 18 year period
the net subsidy actually payable is estimated at $1.8 billion, or an
average of $100 million annually. This net subsidy is approximately
2k per cent of the $7«£ billion direct costs of operating the ships
of the subsidized operators.
In addition to these subsidies already mentioned, there are
numerous other Federal programs designed to assist the American
Merchant Marine. The following are among the more significants C26I]
1. Federal insurance of privately financed ship
construction loans and mortgages—the Government
is authorized to insure construction loans eaual
to 75> per cent of the construction or reconstruction
cost of virtually all types of vessels documented
under the laws of the United States
.
2. Direct mortgage assistance—the Government may
contract for the construction of a ship, and upon
completion sell it to the operator for 2$ per cent
down (or 12§ per cent down if the vessel is of not
less than a lii-knot speed and 3*500 gross tons),
taking a mortgage on the balance of the purchase

price which would be paid back in regular
installments over the statutory life of the
vessel. This type of aid is not being used at
the present time.
3. Trade-in allowances on purchases of new ships
—
a maritime operator may trade in to the Government
an obsolete vessel in exchangi allowance of
credit on the purchase price of a new ship. This
allowance is not paid directly to the owner of the
obsolete vessel, but is (a) applied to the cash
payment required of the owner if the Government
constructs a new vessel for sale to the owner; or
(b) paid, for the account of the owner, to the
shipbuilder constructing a new vessel under a
private financing arrangement. The minimum age
at which a vessel may be considered obsolete has
been reduced from 17 to 12 years, and for tankers
to ten years.
U. Tax benefits—the principal tax t Lfically
allowed ship operators is the exemption from income
tax charges of income from reserve funds. Subsidized
operators are required to deposit annually in reserve
funds all profits after taxes in excess of 10 per cent
of "capital necessarily employed in the business".
Annual depreciation allowances, based on total
acquisition cost, and capital gains from sale or
loss of a vessel must also be deposited in a reserve.
1*5

$. Cargo preference—half of United States Government-
financed cargoes must be transported in United States
flag ships. All United States exports purchased with
Government loans must be carried in United States-flag
vessels, except that waivers may be granted under
special circumstances. All cargoes destined
exclusively for the use of United States Military
Establishments must be carried in United States-
flag ships to the extent that such vessels are
available at reasonable rates.
6. Reservation of coastwise trade—ever since 1789,
it has been the policy of the Federal Government
to reserve the United States coastwise trade to
ships built in the United States and owned and
operated by citizens of the United States, This
has been extended to include the noncontiguous
parts and possessions of the United States,
Alaska, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico.
7. Loans at low rates of interest for construction
of merchant vessels—no new commitments for direct
loans for construction of merchant vessels have
been made since 195>6, and none are anticipated
for 1965.
8. Reduced charter hire of Government-owned vessels,
so as to encourage private operations.
9. Research and development of new types of vessels.
10. Payment for national defense features incorporated
U6

in vessels built either -with or without subsidy.
These many and varied legislative provisions of government support
of merchant marine have been most instrumental in showing our flag in
numerous foreign ports and keeping our ships on the high seas. Undoubt-
edly there is room for improvement in this legislative program with
many proposals already under investigation. It can be strongly stated
that it is to the credit of the United States Government and not to
the shipping industry itself that we have an American Merchant Marine





It must be assumed that until existing world tensions improve, we
are continually faced with a constant war threat. However, the most
serious threat facing the United States now, and in the future, is the
political-economic war waged by the Sino-Soviet bloc. 0-2^] Continuation
of this cold war will occasionally escalate into limited aggressions
and localized "hot" wars. It can be further assumed that an all out
war need for fchips will probably not develop, since scientific experts
and top military strategists claim the United States arsenal holds
more than eight times the necessary weapons to destroy any potential
enemy. [JL2^J It is of primary importance however, that the United
States Merchant Marine be adequately prepared to act immediately and
effectively in support of our naval and military forces in case of
any emergency or political-economic struggle.
The ability to meet our anticipated military and
civilian economy emergency needs is dependent to a large
degree on the ready availability of active, privately-
owned merchant ships employed in gainful ocean commerce.
The degree of promptness with which sealift responds in
an emergency will have an important impact on the out-
come. Time may not permit the activation of many idle
ships. A serious war crisis could well become a race
against time to evacuate nationals, to redeploy troops
and equipment, or to augment and resupply existing forces
overseas. To be prepared for such situations, we must
put first reliance on the ready availability of active
modern merchant ships of all types. L79D
As has been seen in World Wars I and II, we cannot depend upon our
allies or other maritime nations for our shipping requirements. This
has also applied during times of peace, in cases, such as in Cuba and
Viet Nam, where our allies are not in accord with our foreign policies.
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Therefore, we cannot place complete dependence on our allies' merchant
fleets for conducting our international commerce. The only feasible
policy for the United States to follow is one of self-sufficiency in
ocean transportation. Such a program can be pursued by replacing and
building a modern fleet that will be available to promptly meet initial
emergency sealift requirements, and also enhance our political prestige
through world trade.
A speech given by Maritime Administrator, Nicholas Johnson, on the
United States maritime industry was reported in a recent newspaper
article. In it, he verified the declining condition and present status
of our merchant fleet. Mr. Johnson asserted:
. . . although the subsidy program has provided about
315 "fast and modern" ships, hundreds of other ships in
the fleet are slow and deteriorating. For example, he
said, of the 100 unsubsidized ships in regular-route
service, "all but five date from World War II" and all
100 will "disappear from the Merchant Marine over the
next five to 10 years." Only seven of the 130 ships in
the tramp fleet have been built since World War II. If
these 230 regular-route and tramp ships were added to
the subsidy list, Mr. Johnson said, the additional cost
in Government construction subsidies would be about
$1 billion. 1
Although a large quantity of ships is a major objective, quality
must also be considered . At present the military has a requirement for
vessels that have special characteristics, in some instances quite
different from those found in our present conventional-type ships. The
two main deficiencies are in the area of roll-on, roll-off ships for
carrying large cargoes of military vehicles; and in beaching-type
vessels capable of operating where no ports exist. The present
commercial trend is toward containerization, and vessels designed for
1
News item in the Wall Street Journal
, February 10, 1965.
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purpose could probably be easily adapted to military needs for
vetiicle carriers. Containerization of of the most encouraging
prospects of reduced cargo costs, but there rernair many problems to
solye, particularly in the area of foreign trade operations. There is
a need for international agreement on standards before large capital
investments are made to provide containers, specialized ships, and
special port facilities for a unit load system in foreign trade oper-
ations. There is little commercial interest at present in beaching-
type ships, except as currently used along the northern Irish coast
and in certain locations along the west coast of Africa.
With all the technological successes attributable to our economic
system, it is well within our means to design and build vessels of
higher speed with the characteristics necessary to peaceful trade and
ready to be used in any type of war. The two requirements are not so
different that they could not be compromised into a commercially-compet-
itive fleet. Unfortunately, shipbuilding and ship operating are not
readily adaptable to the highly productive techniques that have come to
be associated with American industry in general] and the costs of
building such vessels have, in the past, been excessive. In the last 20
years it has been cheaper to provide government subsidies and operate
with the excess of vessels left over from World War II, than become
involved in an expensive shipbuilding program larger than absolutely
necessary to meet immediate needs. With block obsoL facing our
i Leet, and the expenditures for subsid hunting—about $380 million
in this current fiscal year—drastic action must be taken and without
delay if our merchant shipping fleet is to remai] bitive.
The provisions in the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 to provide for
50

replacement of current tonnage, are not adequate. The Merchant Marine
Act, as even its staunchest advocates now concede, has failed of its
purpose. After 25 years, like most ships, it is hopelessly obsolete.
Surely the time has come to replace it with something better.
The subsidy system offers little incentive toward
self-sufficiency on the part of the shipping industry, and
there is no definite and adequate plan to ensure that our
merchant marine will meet the threats of Communism.
Continuation of current subsidy policy "would aid in the
construction and operation of approximately 1;50 new ships
over the next 20 years." Q19U
Nicholas Johnson asserted "that the 195U Cargo Preference Law has been
2
a miserable failure". He stated that "15 other countries in retalia-
tion have adopted similar policies of their own that tend to cut
United States ships out of the trade. Moreover, the benefits haven't
spurred tramp and other operators to modernize their fleets.
The present administration of the subsidy system is an obstacle to
the progress of the American Merchant Marine. Military requirements
demanding high-speed capabilities for national-defense features are
not at present wholly consistent with commercial interests of economy in
administering construction subsidies. No better evidence of this can
be shown than in the fact that many of the Mariner-class vessels were
put into the reserve fleets as soon as they had been operated only long
enough to be sure the contractor had fulfilled his construction-
contract commitments. Even then, they had to be operated for the
government's account. Many feel that the subsidies presently create
inconsistent aims for labor, business, and government in the maritime





needs, knowing that half of the cost will be paid by the government.
By the same token, he overemphasizes economy in unsubsidized operating
costs and cares too little about subsidized costs. Studies have shown
that ttnsubsidized operators show strong incentives to cost reduction,
such as the use of automation, whereas foreign and subsidized operators
are less motivated in this direction, [J-1~1
There is though, a growing movement favoring subsidy reduction
and increased emphasis on developing methods and devices leading to a
shipping industry which provides maximum productivity through more
efficient use of its current high-cost labor. It is felt that
... a vigorous program of research can point the way to
the development of such an efficient fleet, one able to face
world competition with substantially less subsidy assistance. 0-9]]
Getting our merchant marine back on a competitive status with othei
fleets of the world should be the government's goal in its assistance
program—-not merely the maintenance of a minimum amount of shipping
to meet our national needs as now provided for through heavy sub-
sidization.
A fleet of efficient, modern ships made competitive in world
trade through advanced scientific and technological progress would be
sufficient to provide us with a "first arm of offense" in the cold
war, and, have many of the aforementioned special military character-
istics already built in for possible use in a hot war. A large
merchant fleet that is normally engaged in active trade throughout a
peaceful world is likely to be much more versatile in carrying out
its wartime duties than one limited to special or only so-called
"essential trade routes." Bringing automation, systems analysis, and
other, new developments into an industry, long known for its high
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resistance to change, presents many problems; and such a move would
have to result in a compromise by labor, management, and government
interests; but many feel this effort to free the merchant marine from
the subsidy is a challenge the industry can meet.
Through electronic computers capable of manipulating numbers in
microseconds, large numbers of alternative choices can be explored
quickly and accurately. Variables, such as number of ships, cargo
loadings, -wage rates, fuel costs, freight charges, etc., can be
examined in various combinations in order to determine the most
efficient arrangement of factors
.
The pioneering work in this technique was done by Matson Navi-
gation Company of San Francisco. Since 1958, they have used math-
ematical simulation by computers to explore their particular operating
problems. With the mathematical model they can by use of high-speed
simulation, investigate and examine all the variables, and offer
management more select choices for decision making. The Matson
Navigation Company model, can for example, look in detail at the oper-
ation of approximately 20 ships and five port complexes, simulating
for evaluation a full year of operation in about one and one-half
hours of computer time. The computer in use at Matson is the IBM 701;.
Maritime Administration activity in this field dates from I960,
when a contract was placed with Arthur D. Little and George G. Sharp
Companies to use operations research in studying various aspects of
ship operations. The Maritime Administration's mathematical model
is able to study as many as 75 ships and 20 port complexes with a
time of simulation slightly longer than the Matson model. It is
anticipated that this facility will be available to the shipping
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companies for their assistance in improving overall efficiency of
operations
.
The mathematical model is a method of depicting a real life sit-
uation on a digital computer, in order to check reaction to proposed
changes or remissions to the real life situation, in instances where it
is too costly or impractical to physically implement such changes.
This method offers great promise in investigating typical problem
areas such as subsidy determination, vessel replacements, trade route
studies, evaluation of competition, trade forecasting, and mobilization
planning. In addition, it can be applied to ship design processes,
wherein optimum combinations of design coefficients, dimensions,
displacements, speed and power, can be investigated rapidly. Economic
criteria can be used to approximate construction costs, daily operating
costs, and capital recovery factors. These can be programmed into
computers so that a complete ship design analysis can be developed in
minutes of computer time.
Long-range planning is certainly essential to maintain our merchant
fleet at a high level of preparedness for any eventuality, but there
are also problems requiring attention. Probably the most urgent is the
present precarious status of the "flag of convenience" fleet, also
termed lMflag of necessity" by many United States owners.
The initation of these fleets took place prior to World War II
when many large United States corporations expanded into the ocean-
transportation field through foreign-registered ships to protect their
overseas pipelines of raw materials. Government policy in the 1939-
19U0 era looked upon this as a means of supplying our allies at a time
when, as a nation, we were pledged to neutrality. After the war, many
9x

shipowners again resorted to foreign registry, this time to beat the
high wage rates or avoid government regulations. This move was made
by many foreign, as well as American, shipowners. Most of these
vessels are registered under the flags of Panama, Liberia and
Honduras
.
The operation of ships by American owners under the "flags of
convenience" has long been criticized by foreign shipping interests
and certain European governments for economic reasons relative to
competitive ocean trade. Their major objective is to drive the "flags
of convenience" off the high seas. Their motivation is simple—if
registry under these flags cannot be continued, the ships will have
to be transferred to other flags, and they feel the bulk of the
tonnage would be transferred to the flags of the European maritime
nations. Such transfers would increase the tax revenues of these
countries, and at the same time eliminate competition of what they
claim to be tax-free shipping. United States policy has been to make
no commitments for or against proposals by foreign nations to change
our existing policy. United States owners of vessels under Panamanian,
Liberian or Honduran registry contend that unless government policy
is forthcoming in support of registry under "flags of convenience",
they may well have to sell their vessels or put them under the flag
of one of the stronger traditional Western European maritime nations.
United States maritime labor is also active in exerting pressure
against owners of these vessels, and many American-ship owners who
have split their fleet operations into the above mentioned foreign
registries and also United States registry, are particularly suscep-
tible to this pressure. Q 9^1
55

Presently, the trend is not favorable to ensure continued American
control of this important segment of the world's merchant fleets; and
if it continues to drive American-owned ships away from effective
United States Government control, the only apparent choices are to
either increase the present subsidized size of our own fleet as an
inducement for them to return to the American flag or resort to inter-
governmental agreements to assure that this shipping would revert to
our control in event of national emergency.
Management relations with maritime unions, especially the steve-
dores and teamsters, have long shown a need for special attention on
the part of the government; and there is little hope that the Congress-
ional investigations and "clean-up the waterfront" committees have done
anything more than scratch the surface of this continuing problem.
Labor relations should provide a situation in which both labor and
management can examine common problems in an atmosphere of mutual
confidence and understai:ding. One of the principal difficulties with
the United States Merchant Marine policy today is that such a situation
does not exist. This has, in part, created four problem areas which
exist today in this facet of the United States Merchant Marine
operations . They are as follows
;
1. High wages which are non-competitive internationally.
2. Instability of United States Flag Service due to frequent
strikes or other forms of harassment.
3. Apparent lack of understanding on the part of United States
Merchant Marine labor officials concerning international
law.
k* A rapidly deteriorating "image" of our United States

Merchant Marine, and continuing losses in the area of
Congressional supoort of the merchant marine.
Maritime labor, through effective labor relations frith ship operators,
should develop opportunities and conclude realistic settlements and
solutions of common problems, to avoid future losses.
Much of the legislation nor in force is adequate to provide for
many of the problems facing our merchant marine but is being abused.
A case in point is the practice of the Department of Agriculture,
thereby it transport? bs ly r'0 per cent of its cargoes under the
American flag
—
just enough to meet the minimum established by cargo-
prefefcence legislation. The State Department would also like to see
the Cargo Preference Act eliminated to aid international relations.
There are many other related current problems facing our shipping
industry; and, just as the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 helped bring
about a solution to many of the problems of its day, perhaps a new
approach is needed today.
Currently, the Maritime Commission is advocating the following
major revisions %
1. Rejection of future subsidized construction of any
additional United States flag passenger liners.
2. Elimination of cargo-ship construction subsidies.
3. Gradual reduction of the indirect subsidy provided
by the 1951; Cargo Preference Law.
h» Substitution of a direct operating subsidy to all
ships instead of the present cargo preference benefits
.
This will increase route competition among companies
already operating under operating subsidies.
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5. Modification of current regulations which reauire return
of earnings in excess of 10 per cent to bhe ''ovcrnment in
order to provide incentive to the ship operator arid to
3







A strong, effective peacetime merchant marine that will actively
support our foreign commerce and be available to act as a naval
auxiliary in time of national emergency continues to be essential to
our national economy and security. Experience in two World 7/ars and
the Korean conflict has demonstrated that the United States must depend
on its own merchant fleet and shipbuilding and repair industries for
ocean transportation. After times of conflict however, and the crisis
is past, the merchant marine
... is quite apt to be the first [element of defense] to
meet the axe of dollar-saving and the least likely to
maintain an emergency readiness strength. Q63]
A double dividend is realized for the single expenditure of funds
appropriated for the support of the merchant marine. First, the
United States Merchant Marine can in time of peace further United
States national objectives by "showing the flag", thereby gaining
political prestige and, through delivery of the products of our economy,
preserve America's place in world markets. Second, the merchant marine
developed and maintained in peace becomes readily available in time of
war to cope with emergency sea lift requirements. However it is the
efficient use of funds appropriated to assist this industry that will
determine whether or not the American flag remains on the high seas,
and not how the policies are stated in favor of our merchant fleet.
The need for a strong merchant fleet in the present cold war and
for potential use in a limited or all-out war is all too clear.
The dual function of the merchant marine, as a service
S9

industry in peace and an element of combat in war, has led
to contusion in legislation and administration in the past.
Surely the position of the United States in world affairs
dictates that national strength and security must be
maintained in a high degree of readiness and efficiency at
all times. C 1?!]
Government assistance in the past, has come primarily through
direct financial subsidization; and, althoughthis was brought into the
open and recognized as such under the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, the
basic approach has never changed since enactment of the first mail-
subsidy laws. Today this aid is not sufficient to maintain the large
and modern merchant marine the country needs in its policital-economic
struggle with Communism, and time is running out if we are to replace
our merchant fleet which is rapidly approaching obsolescence. Other
forms of aid such as the cargo-preference, and other discriminatory
practices resorted to by the government have undoubtedly boosted the
percentage of American trade carried on United States-flag ships; but
the efficiency and economy of these forms of assistance do not make
the merchant marine any more self-supporting, nor do such practices add
to the friendly relations we would like to enjoy with other maritime
nations, especially those associated with NATO. Certain federal
assistance that has been provided to the shipping industry through the
Maritime Administration activities has been, however, aimed at helping
the industry help itself. This has taken the form of ship-design
studies, construction of prototype vessels such as the NS SAVANNAH, the
60 ton hydro-foil vessel HS DENNISON, presently under evaluation by the
Maritime Commission, and also education and training of both licensed
and unlicensed seagoing personnel. The government expenditure for the
maritime training programs amounted to more than $3.6 million for the
60

past fisca . Ci U
In recent years, has b
less than $8 million a year—about on< i --half per cent of its
total budget—on research. LlJ In
research activities
.,
the Maritime Administration contracted with the
National Academy of Sciences-National Research Council to study research
and development possibilities in the .shipping industry, and determine
objectives, make suggestions, and advise on methods the Administration
could use as a basis for carrying out its functions along these lines.
The committee formed to stuiy the problem concluded that;
The United States Merchant Marine would directly benefit
from a greatly enlarged program of research and development
which both Government and industry should support. Ql92)
The committees also felt the research appropriations—exclusive of
nuclear and prototype ship funds—should be no less than $10 million
annually at least until 1970. They concluded thatg
The subsidy program which maintains merchant vessels
under United States control should be continued until
such time
„
as the fleet can be made competitive in inter-
national trade. dl9[]
Even if research and development efforts could not be financed to this
extent through current appropriations , it would be wise to divert
subsidy funds to this purpos bhe return for the investment is much
greater in the long run. At present, research and development seem
the most practical and least costly courses the government could
pursue in quest of a truly competitive fleet.
There is another area which could bring rewarding results if
goverr ent took a more active part in it. This is in the shipping




the two segments of the industry see the benefits to be derived from
peaceful cooperation in building up the American Merchant Marine, and
working together rather than against each other, as has so often been
the case. In every instance of a strike or labor trouble, it has been
the economy and the shipping industry itself that has suffered. If the
American Merchant Marine could have been relied upon, there might have
been little need for the formation of such an organization as MSTS.
As in the Korean conflict, MSTS stands ready to provide the nucleus
of an emergency fleet; and nothing should be allowed to hinder or impede
its capability to carry this mission. To the maximum extent practicable
MSTS should have the most modern and efficient vessels our economy can
afford. It has proven its worth in both peace and war and is consid-
ered an efficient business organization in the Department of Defense.
The United States needs control of a powerful force of modern,
efficient merchant vessels to;
1. Protect American interests from excessive ocean-
transportation rates.
2. Act as a "Fourth Arm of Defense" in event of armed
conflict.
3. Provide a "First Arm of Offense" in the present
cold war.
The government's program of support for the American Merchant
Marine can best be achieved through policies designed to help the
shipping industry by:
1« Emphasizing government assistance on research and
development projects.




3. Aiding improvement of labor-mantgement relations in
the maritime industry.
U. Recognizing the "flags of convenience" fleets as a
necessity for national defense.
These policies if carried ou^ 5 will assist the shipping industry
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